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INCORPORATION OF FAMILY PROPERTY AS A
DEVICE FOR AVOIDING TAXES
It is generally conceded that an individual or a corporation
may regulate or change its business with a view to the reduction
or avoidance of future taxation. But the line between legiti-
mate avoidance and illegal evasion is extremely hazy and uncer-
tain. The vagaries of the situation are suggested by Holmes in
Buten v. Wisconsin1 where he says: "We do not speak of eva-
sion because when the law draws a line, a case is on one side of
it or the other, and if on the safe side, is none the Worse legally
that a party has availed himself to the full of what the law per-
mits. When an act is condemned as an evasion, what is meant
is that it is on the wrong side of the line indicated by the policy
if not by the mere letter of the law." As the tax burden has
increased, the problem of what is evasion and what mere avoid-
ance, has become more difficult; for as the tax laws have become
more inclusive and scientific, correspondingly ingenious and
intricate schemes have been utilized to escape their consequences.
Corporate organizations for the handling of family property
have become increasingly common,2 and while a more efficient
handling of large estates may be a general motive back of the
creation of many of these corporations, 3 a desire to save taxes is
doubtless the most significant single factor. While the corporate
device forms a convenient instrumentality for manipulation, it
seldom, in and of itself, solves a tax problem. Not only must
the usual corporation taxes be borne in mind, but care must be
taken to avoid such ordinary taxes as those on transfers in con-
1240 U. S. 625 (1916).
As to the situation in England see article by W. Sowden-'Con-
version of Landed Estates and Baronial Manors into Limited Liability
Companies", 45 Tr. Co. Mag. 17, 1927.
"For a discussion of this subject see article by H. B. Fraser-
"Merits of Trusteeing an Estate as against Incorporation," 45 Tr. Co.
Mag. 433, 1927.
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templation of death, or on transfers to take effect in possession
or enjoy3aent at or after death. In fact more than ordinary
caution may sometimes be necessary due to a tinge of hostility
which one feels in the attitude of many courts toward any scheme
which approaches the line of evasion.
Where a family corporation is created to minimize inherit-
ance taxes there is danger that the transfer of property to the
corporation or the distribution of shares among the members of
the family will be construed either as a gift in contemplation of
death or as a transfer to take effect in possession or enjoyment at
or after death, and as such taxable. No generalization can be
made as to what constitutes a transfer in contemplation of death.
The Federal Treasury Regulations provide that such a transfer
occurs "wherever the person making it is influenced to do so by
such an expectation of death, arising from bodily or mental
conditions, as prompt persons to dispose of their property to
those whom they deem proper objects of their bounty.' '4 Some
state courts stress the sickness or peril of the grantor5 while
others speak of such a gift as one actuated by the same motives
as move one to make a will.6 It is quite apparent that whether
or not a gift is to be construed as having been made in contempla-
tion of death is a question of fact which is to be determined by
the peculiarities of the individual case.7 Because it is a question
of fact, the advantage lies largely with the taxpayer, for as was
pointed out by the dissenting judge in Matter of Maldstedt:s
"'It is hardly to be expected that in transactions of this character
positive proof can be given that the transaction was within the
purview of the statute. The taxing power is not party to the
transaction, and it is almost necessarily compelled to rely upon
the attendant facts and circumstances which it may subsequently
elicit, and the conclusions that may fairly be drawn therefrom."
Thus the advantages which the government may gain through a
very general definition and whatever presumptions which may be
4 Revenue Act of 1924-Regulations 68, Art. 16.
.5Matter of Baker 83 App. Div. 530, (1903) aff'd. 178 N. Y. 575
(1904).
ORe Reynolds, 169 Cal. 600, 147 p. 268 (1915).
't Spreckles v. State, 30 Cal. App. 363, 158 P. 549 (1916) ; McDougald
v. Wulzen, 34 Cal. App. 21, 166 Pac. 1033 (1917); Peop~e v. Kefley, 218
Ill. 509, 75 N. E. 1038 (1905); Re Crary, 64 N. Y. S. 560, 31 Misc. 72
(1900).
3 67 App. Div. 176, 73 N. Y. S. 818 (1901).
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declared to exist, are largely offset by the taxpayer's being in
control of the most important facts.
As has been intimated, transfers in contemplation of death
which take place through the medium of a family corporation
present no very unique problem. In Abstract and Title Guaranty
v. State,9 H. organized a corporation, transferring real estate of
considerable value to it, and dividing its stock between his three
sons. H. was eighty years old and in poor health at the time of
the transaction. Part of the agreement with the corporation was
that it should suitably support H. for life. He died within six
months and the transfer to the sons was quite reasonably held to
be one in contemplation of death.
A case much more difficult to agree with is that of In re
Pauson.10  Here the decedent when seventy years old and in
good health formed a corporation and distributed its stock to the
members of his family; he was elected president of the new cor-
poration at an annual salary of $20,000, and was to attain active
management of the business. He died about a year later and the
gifts of stock were held to be gifts in contemplation of death.
The court did not seem to agree entirely with the attitude of the
trial court toward the facts but held that if from the evidence,
the trial court could properly infer that the transfer was or was
not made in contemplation of death, the finding, of the trial
court was not to be disturbed even though the conclusion of the
appellate court on the same evidence might be different. One is
inclined to believe that the lower court frowned upon the cor-
porate organization as an undesirable device to evade taxation,
and was willing to strain the facts in order to hold that the trans-
fers in question were in contemplation of death. The case
furnishes an interesting contrast with the earlier one of Spreckcels
v. State," which arose in the same jurisdiction. In this case,
some seven months after the death of her husband Mrs. S. organ-
ized the San Christina Investment Co. "to employ it as an instru-
mentality for properly conserving, handling, and managing with
profit" the vast and varied property interests left by her hus-
band. Mrs. S. had an ample independent income and the-evi-
dence tended to show that she was desirous of making an imme.
'173 Cal. 691, 161 P. 264 (1916).
1186 CaL 358, 199 P. 331 (1921).
-30 Cal. App. 363, 158 P. 549 (1916).
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diate provision for her three children rather than attempting to
avoid a will or evade inheritance taxes. Though she had not
been in any immediate fear of death, her health was not good and
she died at the age of seventy-nine, within a month after the
time when she gave most of the San Christina stock to her chil-
dren. The appellate court held that there was sufficient evi-
dence to sustain the lower court's finding that the gifts were not
in contemplation of death.
These cases indicate that the courts will go much farther to
construe a transfer of an interest in a family corporation as in
contemplation of death when its apparent primary object is tax
saving, than they will when the tax saving element is merely inci-
dental to some other purpose, such as the immediate benefiting
of the grantee or the relieving of the grantor of some of the
burdens of the management of his property. Furthermore, it is
frequently desirable that the grantor retain one or more of the
shares in the corporation on the theory that if he were contem-
plating impending death or peril, there would beno point to his
retaining any shares.12
Most jurisdictions impose a tax upon transfers not intended
to take effect in possdssion or enjoyment until at or after the
death of the transferrer ind thus further minimize the possibility
of one transmitting his estate to the objects of his bounty free
from inheritance taxes. The cases in which these provisions
have been most commonly applied have involved trusts, but the
principles laid down are equally applicable to certain corporate
organizations and are of special significance in those instances
where family corporations are organized and a portion of the
stock placed in trust for certain beneficiaries.
A settlor may retain the income; the supervision over the
funds; the power of revocation; the power to change benefici-
aries; or the power to vote shares forming a part of the trust
fund. The extent to which the retention of one or more of these
powers will make the transfer taxable will vary necessarily with
the individual case, but according to the ordinary view, where the
net income is to be paid to the settlor for life, the trust is tax-
'In re Ma7hstedt, 67 App. Div. 176, 73 N. Y. S. 818 (1901), aff'd.
without opinion in 171 N. Y. 652, 63 N. E. 1119.
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able.1 3 So too, where only a part of the income is retained by
the grantor, the tax is imposed upon a proportionate share of the
corpus.1 4 Under the federal Estates Tax and some state statutes
where the settlor reserves the power of revocation, the fund is
taxable even though he does not retain the income.15 But the
general view is that the power of revocation alone will not render
the trust subject to taxation as part of the grantor's estate.16 The
amount of control which one may retain over the corpus without
thereby rendering it taxable as part of his estate varies with the
facts of the particular case.'
7
A few cases have arisen where transfers to a family corpora-
tion or the distribution of the stock of such an organization have
been held to be within the provisions taxing transfers not in-
tended to take effect in possession or enjoyment until at or after
death. In the case of In re Ball:" B, four years prior to his
death, placed one-half of the shares of a corporation, owned by
himself, in an envelope and handed it to one of his sons saying
"I give you one-half of the stock of the B. Realty Co." In like
manner he gave the other half of the stock to another son. No
transfer stamps were used, no evidence of the transfer was shown
on the books of the company, and B continued to act as the sole
stockholder. The two envelopes containing the stock were placed
in the safe of the company, where they remained until B's death.
The transfer was held taxable as one not intended to be complete
until after the death of B. It is, of course, impossible to say just
how much more parties would need to do 'to make the transfer
nontaxable but certaily if it had been entered on the books of the
company in the instant case the court would have had much
"In re Cochrane, 117 Misc. 18, 190 N. Y. S. 895, aff'd 202 App. Div.
751, 194 N. Y. S. 924 (1922); Matter of Green, 153 N. Y. 223, 47 N. E.
292 (1897); Crocker v. Shaw, 174 Mass. 266, 54 N. E. 549 (1899);
Mcaughn v. Girard Trust Co., 11 F. (2d) 520 (1926); People v. North-
era Tr. Co., 330 Ill. 238, 161 N. E. 525 (1928).
"Bradley v. Nichols, 13 F. (2d) 857 (1926); State v. Weleh's
Estate, 235 Mich. 555, 209 N. W. 930 (1926).
"U. S. C. A. No. 1094 (1928); Thurber Fed. Estate Tax No. 52
(1921); N. Y. Ann. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1923) c. 61 No. 220 (4).
"In re Dolan's Estate, 279 Pa. 582, 124 A. 176 (1924); People v.
2orthern Tr. Co., 289 Il1. 475, 124 N. D. 662 (1919); Matter of Coch-
rane, 117 Misc. 18, 190 N. Y. S. 895 (1921); Matter of Miller's Estate,
236 N. Y. 290, 14 N. E. 701, (1923).
' TMatter of Bostwick, 160 N. Y. 489, 55 N. E. 208 (1899); Matter of
Jountz, 120 Wise. 289, 198 N. Y. S. 442; Matter of Ferris' Estate, 121
A. 692, 94 N. J. Eq. 726 (1923).
Ii 161 App. Div. 79, 146 N. Y. S. 499 (1914).
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greater difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the transfer was
taxable.
A somewhat similar defect existed in the plan found in the
case of Re Romney'0 only here it was the transfer to the cor-
poration rather than the distribution of stock to the members
of the family which the court decided was not intended to take
effect until after the death of the transferrer. The facts showed
that in 1903, R. and his ten sons agreed to form a corporation.
Of 2,000 shares, 1990 were subscribed to by R. and one share by
each of the other incorporators. The entire capital stock was
paid for by R's conveying certain real estate to the corporation,
and he then proceeded to distribute 1982 shares among his 24
children. A few days later R. executed an instrument by which
he purported to transfer to the corporation $500,000 worth of
securities for "$1 and for good and valuable consideration."
Again in 1908, R. purported to "sell and assign" certain stocks
and bonds to the corporation; but on neither occasion were the
securities transferred on the books of the corporation issuing
them. The securities were indorsed and kept in the company
safe but R. continued to be paid the dividends personally until
his death some time after 1918. It was held that the ownership
and beneficial interest of the securities did not rest in the cor-
poration during the life of the donor. These cases show the
danger in not carrying the transfer through in regular fashion
on the books of the corporation involved. If the grantor wishes
to retain control, the better plan seems to be for him'to depend
merely upon the physical control of the securities. This idea
was successfully carried out in the case of In re Bassett's
Estate.20  Here B was an executive of General Motors and as
such was given the opportunity of purchasing 4,800 shares of
Manager's Security Co. stock (subsidiary of General Motors).
The price was $300,000 and B. borrowed $290,000, giving the
stock as collateral. Later he caused the G. Co. to be formed
"partly to facilitate the handling of his investments and partly
to minimize taxes." B. then offered his 4,800 shares of Man-
ager's Security stock to the G. Co. in consideration of its issuing
to him 12,500 shares of no par common stock. After this certi-
ficate was issued to B. he exchanged it for several others issued
60 Utah 173, 207 P. 139 (1922).
" - Mich. - , 224 N. W. 639 (1929).
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in the names of various members of his family; these individuals
indorsed the shares allotted to them and returned them to B.
together with demand notes in payment for them. (The mem-
bers of the family were notsolvent). B. retained possession of
these indorsed certificates and payments were made on the
demand notes from dividends of the G. Co. of which B. was presi-
dent and manager. On his death (age 52) the value of the
Manager's Security stock was about $1,000,000 and the state
sought to collect an inheritance tax on this. The court held that
the transfer of the stock certificates to the G. holding company
effectively transferred the decedent's interest, precluding the
assessment of an inheritance tax thereon. In reaching this con-
clusion the court said "Incorporation to reduce future taxes has
no fraudulent or illegal undertone. Both the state and federal
governments take account of the differences between individuals
and corporations and impose taxes upon them of different bases.
No just criticism can be made of individuals who accept the
option thus offered and use that method of ownership and man-
agement which best serves their advantages." Michigan, like
most other jurisdictions, taxes gifts to take effect in possession
or enjoyment at or after death, but the instant case seems to
be correct in refusing to regard this as such gift; for even
though the actual physical control was in B. the members of his
family were legally entitled to their respective shares in the
G. Co. and through it, to the Manager's Security stock.
A number of variations in the use of the corporate organiza-
tion may be obtained to effect a device which most nearly meets
the peculiar individual needs of the creator and the members of
his family. Thus, for example, a holding company may be
formed with two classes of stock-voting-(ommon) and non-
voting (preferred). If the voting stock is then issued to the
original holder, he retains control; the non-voting stock might all
be given to the spouse or distributed among various members of
the family. In either event it would be possible to regulate the
dividends so as to give the non-voting stockholders the bulk or
only a small share of the income. In so far as they received any
income, it would tend to reduce the amount of income tax paid
the family as a whole, and in so far as an interest in the securi-
ties of the holding company was passed, there would be a cutting
down of probable succession taxes.
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Under some such general plan, varying results may be
reached by changing the proportions of the voting and non-
voting stocks; by placing the non-voting stock in trust for mem-
bers of the family; or by not declaring any dividends on the
voting stock and allowing the income to be accumulated by the
corporation while the tax of such income is paid by the stock-
holders. B y paying the tax in this manner the penalty imposed
by the federal Revenue Act of 1928, section 104, for accumulat-
ing to evade surtaxes would not be incurred.
While the provision mentioned (No. 104 of 1928 Revenue
Act) is very difficult to enforce and no court or board decision
has been rendered on it,21 the penalty is so severe and the phras-
ing so inclusive that one should hesitate to encroach on to any
of the territory which seems to be forbidden. The section pro-
vides in substance that if a corporation is organized to avoid
surtaxes by allowing profits to accumulate, it shall pay a penalty
of fifty per cent of its income in addition to the regular tax.
Furthermore "the fact that any corporation is a mere holding or
investment company, or that the gains or profits are permitted
to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business, shall
be prima facie evidence of a purpose to escape the surtax." The
phrase "beyond the reasonable needs of the business" furnishes
a loophole of escape for the ordinary business corporation.22 Not
only may there be many "reasonable needs" justifying accumu-
lation but it is possible for accountants to concoct reserves which
may actually amount to illegal accumulations but the validity of
which is extremely difficult to attack, as a practical matter. It
is probably due to this fact and the extreme severity of the
penalty that so few cases have arisen under section 104. How-
ever, a holding company for family property could not create
'In an article on "Surtax Evasion Through Corporate Form", in
the February, 1930, number of the International Revenue News (v. 3,
no. 8) p. 9, W. W. Grimes, of the Office of the General Council, says:
"While the provision substantially in the same form appeared first in
the 1918 act, no court or board decision has been rendered, although
the department has released the information that more than $5,000,000
has been collected in cases handled under the provision. At the close
of 1929 there were 3 cases pending in the courts, 38 in the Board of Tax
Appeals (only 1 of which has been tried), 38 in the general council's
office in the prima facie stage, and 65 in the Income Tax Unit in prep-
aration. The general counsel's office has disposed of 385 cases, exclu-
sive of those in the unit."
22"Section 220 - Should Corporations Worry?" by James L.
Dohr, 6 Nat. Income Tax Mag. 169 (1928).
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fictitious reserves with the facility of a. regular business corpora-
tion and so the risk of incurring the penalty is greater in
instances of the family corporation. In the case of such an
organization, the danger might be somewhat lessened by diversi-
fying the shareholders or by paying some dividends.
The difficulties presented by the prohibition of accumula-
tions, as well as a desire to avoid the twelve per cent tax on
incomes of corporations, where the company organized to take
over the family property and business is not simply a holding
company, has given rise recently to an interest in incorporating
in foreign countries. The countries most frequently mentioned
as desirable for such purposes are Newfoundland, Canada, and
Panama. There is good reason to suppose that there are a num-
ber of other countries whose corporation laws are just as advant-
ageous and that it is partly proximity and partly pure chance
which has thus far caused the lawyers interested in this work to
investigate and stress the advantages of these particular coun-
tries. While Panama laws are considered favorable, instances
of incorporation in that country seem to be very rare. This may
be attributed to a certain distrust and fear of "the instability
of conditions" in Latin-American countries generally. Canada
and Newfoundland, therefore, are apparently the chief competi-
tors for whateVer business of this type which there may be. New-
foundland, doubtless influenced by lobbyists from the United
States, has gone so far as to solicit the business of foreign hold-
ing companies, as is evidenced by the following provision in its
Income Tax Act of 1929 (No. 2 (2)). "Nothing herein shall be
construed to tax the gain, profits, interests or other income of
"Personal Holding Companies' organized under the Companies
Act of this Colony, derived from the investment in trading
stocks, bonds, debentures or other securities where such stocks,
bonds, debentures or other securities are located outside the
colony of Newfoundland at all times during the taxable year;
however, said 'Personal Holding Corporation' shall be liable to
an annual Franchise Tax computed on the basis of their author-
ized capital as set forth in sub-section (s)." (In no case to
exceed $250).
"The Term 'Personal Holding Corporation' as used in this
Act, shall be construed to mean a company having not more than
five stockholders all of whom are non-residents and 80% or more
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of whose assets, other than cash, consists of stocks, bonds, deben-
tures, or other securities and which does not do business with the
public of 'this colony.' '23
. While no such strong invitation is to be found in the Com-
panies Act of the Dominion of Canada or the similar acts of any
of the Provinces, th'ey contain liberal provisions making incor-
poration quite easy and inexpensive." Under the Dominion Com-
panies Act, for instance, it is not necessary for any of the officers
or directors to be British subjects or residents of Canada. No
meetings need be held there except the annual general meetings
of stockholders at which the directors are elected; and the incon-
yenience of this requirement may ,be minimized by proxy voting.
Fees for incorporation on the granting of letters Patent are by
no means prohibitive.24  Holders of bonds or stock of such
Canadian Companies who are not residents or engaged in busi-
ness in Canada are not subject to personal property taxes in
Canada, nor to income taxes on interest and dividends received
from the Company.
The principal drawback to a Canadian corporation as
against a Newfoundland one lies in the tendency of the Income
Tax Department to bring such companies within the Income Tax
Act. To date, the opinions given out have tended to exclude this
type of company from the operation of that act but their position
is precarious and it seems highly probable that if the question
presents itself frequently the Tax Department may decide that
these organizations are "doing business" within the meaning of
the act, and so, subject to its provisions.
A factor which would have to be taken into consideration
regardless of whether the Corporation were organized in Canada
or Newfoundland is the Succession Taxes on Death Duties.
Taking as typical the situation of a company organized under the
Dominion Companies Act with headquarters in Quebec, we find
that the Provincial government includes to the imposition of this
tax even where such securities are transferrable only outside the
Province.
'The assertions made on this and the following pages are based
upon information gathered from New York lawyers who have been In
actual contact with instances of incorporation in foreign countries.
"Where the capital is $100,000 or less the fee is $100; then there
is an additional dollar charged for each thousand up to and including
$200,000; then fifty cents for each additional thousand to and including
$500,000; and then twenty cents for each additional thousand.
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But the collection of this tax may be made extremely difficult
and perhaps entirely evaded by making the securities "bearer'"
instruments. If the deceased resided outside of Canada and
held no other Canadian securities, his executors would be under
no enforceable duty of reporting the death of such debenture
holder to the Provincial authorities. Furthermore, while a cor-
poration having its chief office in the Province in which the per-
son dying outside was possessed of an interest, is to notify the
Provincial Treasurer of such death, it is not likely that in the
ordinary course of events, the company would be apprised of the
death of the holder if they were transferable by delivery.
Even when viewed in the most favorable light, the formation
of a foreign holding company for the handling of family prop-
erty is not as efficient and sure working a device for the avoid-
ance of taxes as one might desire. If one wishes to accumulate
he is certainly gambling on the U. S. Treasury's failing to enforce
No. 104 against him. While information on foreign organiza-
tions may be more difficult to obtain, the language of the section
in question seems broad enough to include all holding companies
seeking to evade the federal surtaxes, regardless of where they
may be incorporated. In addition there are the foreign income
taxes and death duties to be considered. These may be avoided
temporarily and even for the entire life of the corporation but
there can be no certainty that they will not be enforced and
collected.
It cannot be denied that certain estates profit by incorpora-
tion. If the securities of a wealthy individual are highly diversi-
fied geographically the surest way to avoid multiple succession
taxation is by incorporating in the state of such individual's
domicile or in a state which has no inheritance tax (Florida).
The state of residence and the federal government are then the
only ones which are entitled to impose a succession tax. How-
ever, there are few advantages to incorporation as clear cut as
the one just mentioned. The needs and possibilities of the indi-
vidual estate should be considered by experts in estate planning.
'It may be that incorporation will prove to be advantageous in
the particular case considere. or it may prove otherwise for in-
corporation of family estates, is no certain panacea for the tax
burden.
ARTHUR T. MARIN.
